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Abstract
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find that the costless search equilibrium works well for products with a relatively low value, and,
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1 Introduction
This paper intends to study the empirical usefulness of theoretical search models. For this pur-
pose, we take a simple model originally presented in Stahl (1989) and allow for sequential and
non-sequential search.1 An important feature of the model is that there are two types consumers,
namely, consumers whose opportunity cost of time is zero and thus are fully informed, and unin-
formed consumers who get a first price quotation for free and who face positive search costs for
each additional search.2 This simple model accommodates two of the most frequently encountered
equilibria in the search literature. In particular, the model has an equilibrium where uninformed
consumers search for one price and then stop searching as the benefits of an additional search are
smaller than the search cost. This is the equilibrium discussed in Stahl (1989) and it also arises
under non-sequential search when the search cost is high compared to the value of the purchase.
We refer to this equilibrium as the costless search equilibrium. A second type of equilibrium has
uninformed consumers randomizing between searching for one price and searching for two prices.
We call this equilibrium a costly search intensity equilibrium to distinguish it from the case in which
buyers sample just one firm. It arises, for example, in the non-sequential search literature when
search costs are low enough (cf., Burdett and Judd, 1983). Both equilibria exhibit price dispersion.
In line with the main aim of the paper, we consider the empirical predictions of the different
equilibria and ask the question whether the above simple model can explain observed price disper-
sion and if so, which of the two equilibria presented above seems to accommodate observed data
better. In particular, we try to stay close to the theoretical model and use the following method-
ology. The two equilibria yield different functional forms of the price distributions to be expected
in the market, as well as theoretical restrictions on those distributions for consumer search to be
optimal. We use this information (price equations and optimal search conditions) to estimate the
parameters of the theoretical models, in particular the fraction of zero-cost consumers, search inten-
sity, marginal cost and search cost. For this aim, we gather price data from on-line markets using
shopper.com, an American based search engine. We focus on the market for computer hardware
and peripherals, in particular on keyboards, mice, memory chips and computer cables. In total we
1Papers like McAfee (1995) and Reinganum (1979) are in the sequential search tradition; whereas Acemoglu
and Shimer (2000), Burdett and Judd (1983) and Janssen and Moraga-Gonza´lez (2004) follow the non-sequential
paradigm. Morgan and Manning (1985) study the question which paradigm is more appropriate under quite general
circumstances concerning the delay with which consumers get the information they are searching for.
2The assumption that consumers obtain the first price observation for free is common in the search literature (see
e.g. Burdett and Judd, 1983 and Stahl, 1989). Janssen and Moraga-Gonza´lez (2004) present a search model where
all price observations are costly. For the implications of this alternative assumption in the present paper see footnote
8 below.
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examine markets for 87 products and a common feature we see is that prices are quite dispersed.3
Using these price data we estimate (by maximum likelihood) the different models and test whether
the equilibria described above are consistent with the price observations we gathered.
Our first observation is that it is difficult to empirically distinguish between the sequential
search model and the non-sequential search model provided that consumers sample just one firm.
The reason is that the equations that characterize firm price setting are empirically identical in
these two cases.
Secondly, we examine the empirical performance of the costless search equilibrium. We find
that the restrictions this equilibrium imposes on the data are always rejected when the value of
the purchase is large enough. Indeed, this equilibrium is rejected for all but two memory chips,
for all but one keyboard whose average price is above $40-$45, for all mice with an average price
above $35 and for 5 out of 11 cables of similar value. By contrast, when the value of the purchase
is low the costless search equilibrium performs much better. For example, this equilibrium cannot
be rejected for 9 out of 10 low-valued computer cables, nor for 5 out of 8 low-priced keyboards, nor
for 7 out of 10 cases in the markets for inexpensive mice. This evidence suggests that the costless
search equilibrium is useful in markets where the value of the purchase is low, a prediction that is
in line with the theoretical models we examine in this paper.
As to the empirical performance of the costly search equilibrium, we find that this equilibrium
cannot be rejected in almost all cases (for 86 out of 87 products!). The estimates of the parameters
of the costly search equilibrium also seem to be of reasonable magnitude. For example, in the
markets for computer memory, the estimated fraction of consumers who search at no cost ranges
from 4% to around 63% and are in most cases significant; likewise, the estimates of the number
of captive consumers who search just once ranges from 23% to 74%, and are in all cases highly
significant.
Finally, when comparing the empirical performance of the costly search and the costless search
equilibria we see that likelihood scores are always higher for the former than for the latter. This
implies that the costly search equilibrium outperforms the alternative equilibrium. This is reason-
able because the model with costly search includes a set of consumers who search for two prices
and this extra variable gives this equilibrium more flexibility vis-a`-vis the costly search one. To
see if the addition of an extra parameter is empirically justified, we run a likelihood ratio test. We
3Baye, Morgan and Scholten (2001) examine price data for 1000 consumer electronics over an 8-month period.
They find strong support for the idea that price dispersion is ubiquitous in on-line markets and a stable feature over
time.
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find that, for example in the market for keyboards, at a 5% significance level the null hypothesis
that the models are equal is always rejected. This strongly suggests that the costly search inten-
sity equilibrium yields a better explanation of observed price dispersion than the other type of
equilibrium.4
Our paper is a contribution to the study of the empirical relevance of search models, and more
in general price dispersion models. Some studies have found that price dispersion is negatively
related to low search costs and high benefits from search (see e.g. Brown and Goolsbee, 2002;
Brynjolfsson and Smith, 2000; Clay, Krishnan and Wolff, 2001 and Sorensen, 2000 and 2001).
Our paper differs from this work in that we employ the explicit theoretical restrictions that are
obtained from a consumer search and oligopolistic pricing model to test its empirical validity. This
is a more direct test of its usefulness and we find that the fit between the data and the costly search
equilibrium is remarkably good. Villas-Boas (1995) used a related approach to assess the empirical
usefulness of Varian’s (1980) model of sales using data from the coffee and saltine crackers markets.
He found the model rejected for 66% of the coffee brands and for 50% of the crackers brands. This
high percentage of rejection is consistent with our findings on the costless search equilibrium. The
analysis in our paper is closely related to recent work by Hong and Shum (2004), who present
a useful methodology to estimate search cost distributions on the basis of price data alone. An
important difference between their paper and ours is that our theoretical model allows for both
sequential and non-sequential search, which enables us to stick to the same estimation method and
directly compare the empirical results of the two search protocols. In their article the models they
estimate are different and also the estimation techniques, which makes a direct comparison between
the models difficult. Another important difference is that while they examine competitive models,
i.e., models where there are infinitely many firms in the market, we study the more realistic case of
oligopoly. As shown in Janssen and Moraga-Gonza´lez (2004) and Stahl (1989), firm pricing becomes
more monopolistic when the number of firms increases, and this discourages search. We finally note
that while Hong and Shum estimate a search cost distribution with continuous support, we estimate
a two point distribution including an atom of consumers whose opportunity cost of time is zero
and thus sample all the stores before buying. Including an atom of zero-search-cost consumers is
important on theoretical grounds since it guarantees existence and uniqueness of equilibrium under
sequential search (Stahl, 1996) but also on empirical grounds since, according to Whelan (2001),
Internet shoppers are increasingly falling into two types: bargain hunters who visit as many shops
4Moreover, we note that the costless search equilibrium yields estimates of the percentage of fully informed
consumers that seem much too high.
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as possible and brand loyalists who just visit one or two shops.
Our paper is also related to recent experimental work on price dispersion and, in particular,
on search models. Morgan, Orzen and Sefton (2003) test a model similar to Varian (1980) in the
laboratory. Price dispersion arises in the experimental data and the comparative statics effects of
key parameter changes conform very well with the theory. However, there seems to be a systematic
bias in the sense that subjects tend to charge higher prices than what the theoretical model predicts.
We note that Varian’s model and our costless search model are observationally equivalent so our
result that this model does not perform very well is in line with this latter finding in the lab. Abrams,
Sefton and Yavas (2000) designed an experiment to investigate markets with consumer search. In
particular, they focused on the extreme cases known as Diamond and Bertrand paradoxes. In a
first treatment they provided each buyer with information about a single price. In this situation
equilibrium predicts that sellers charge the monopoly price and buyers abstain from searching.
In a second treatment they informed buyers of two prices, which leads to the prediction that
firms use marginal cost pricing and again buyers do not search. They found a clear effect of
information provision on the level of equilibrium prices. However, they pointed out a divergence
between observed and predicted prices and argued that this is consistent with ultimatum game
experiments.5 Cason and Friedman (2003) present a laboratory study based on the ‘noisy search
model’ of Burdett and Judd (1983). The model fared very well in predicting the extent of price
dispersion and the comparative statics of higher search costs and larger sample sizes. However,
as in Abrams et al. (2000), Cason and Friedman also found systematic differences between the
empirical data and the theoretical prediction, in particular, subjects tended to quote higher prices
more frequently than what was expected on the basis of the theory. The authors also found that
tests of the goodness of fit strongly rejected the null hypothesis that the data come precisely from
the theoretical distribution. Finally, Baye and Morgan (2004) propose two bounded rationality
theories to reconcile the observed departure from Nash-behavior in the experiments of Abrams,
Sefton and Yavas (2000) and Dufwenberg and Gneezy (1998). The predictions derived from the
bounded rationality models explain the experimental data much better that Bertrand-Nash and
random pricing and the bounded rationality models are not rejected often.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes in more detail the model we use. Section 3
provides a complete characterization of the equilibria that arise for distinct parameter constellations,
for both search protocols. Section 4 discusses the data we have collected, the empirical methodology
and the results. Section 5 concludes.
5Davis and Holt (1996) obtained similar results in a related experimental analysis.
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2 The Model
We examine a model of oligopolistic competition in the presence of consumer search. The model is
similar to Stahl (1989), but we examine both sequential and non-sequential search. On the supply
side of the market there are N firms. Firms produce the good at constant returns to scale and
their identical unit cost is equal to r. On the demand side of the market, there is a unit mass
of buyers who wish to purchase at most a single unit of the good. We assume that a proportion
λ ∈ (0, 1) of the consumers has negligible opportunity cost of time and therefore search for prices
costlessly.6 We will refer to these buyers as informed.7 The other 1 − λ percent of the buyers,
referred to as uninformed, must pay search cost c > 0 to observe every price quotation beyond the
first one.8 These consumers may search either sequentially (a´ la Stahl, 1989) or non-sequentially
(a´ la Burdett and Judd, 1983). Under sequential search, a buyer decides whether to sample a
second firm or not upon observation of the price of the first firm, and so on. Under non-sequential
search, buyers decide how many prices to observe before purchasing from the store with the lowest
observed price.9 After consumers search optimally, they buy the good from the lowest priced store
in their sample. We assume that the maximum price any buyer is willing to pay for the good is
v.10 The ratio (v − r)/c determines the type of equilibrium one encounters under non-sequential
search and we shall refer to it as the relative value of the purchase (for an uninformed buyer).
Firms and buyers play a simultaneous move game. An individual firm chooses its price taking
price choices of the rivals as well as consumers’ search behavior as given. Likewise, an individual
buyer forms conjectures about the distribution of prices in the market and decides on his/her opti-
mal search strategy. We shall look for symmetric Nash equilibria.11 Let us denote the distribution
of prices charged by a firm by F (p).
6An atom of “shoppers” guarantees existence and uniqueness of symmetric Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies
when consumers search sequentially (see Stahl, 1996).
7We regard the proportion of informed consumers λ as the proportion of consumers making use of a shopbot.
Shopbots make it very easy for consumers to save time and money as they can see in just a few mouse clicks which
shop is the cheapest, whereafter they need just another few clicks to conduct the purchase.
8Relaxing this assumption leads to a new equilibrium where less informed consumers do not enter the market
with positive probability. While this equilibrium has interesting properties (see Janssen, Moraga-Gonza´lez and
Wildenbeest, 2004), it is observationally equivalent to the costless search equilibrium. This is easily seen as in the
relevant equations describing the equilibrium price distribution, (1 − λ) is replaced by µ(1 − λ), where µ is the
probability that uninformed consumers do search once. Without a priori restrictions on µ and/or λ, one cannot get
independent estimates for these parameters.
9See Morgan and Manning (1985) for a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of these search methods.
10The assumption of inelastic demands is not restrictive in the markets we focus on in our empirical part, namely,
keyboards, mice, computer cables and memory chips.
11As pointed out in Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (1992), there may exist asymmetric equilibria but the symmetric
one is the most reasonable equilibrium in these settings.
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3 Equilibria
3.1 Consumers’ equilibrium behavior
The theoretical results follow Stahl (1989) and Janssen and Moraga-Gonza´lez (2004). Since the
equilibrium restrictions will be used in the empirical strategy, here we gather these results. Our
first observation is that, irrespective of the search protocol, consumers will not search much in
equilibrium.
Lemma 1 (a) Assume that uninformed consumers search sequentially; then they will not search
beyond the first firm. (b) Assume that uninformed consumers search non-sequentially; then they
will not search for three prices or more with positive probability, nor for two prices with probability
one.
Proof. For (a), see Lemma 2 of Stahl (1989). For (b), see Lemma 1 of Janssen and Moraga-
Gonza´lez (2004). ¥
We now introduce some notation that we will use throughout the paper. Let µ1 be the prob-
ability with which an uninformed buyer searches for a price quotation. Lemma 1 implies that if
consumers search sequentially only one candidate for equilibrium exist: µ1 = 1. In this case we
shall say that they search costlessly.
For the case of non-sequential search, Lemma 1 implies that there may be two equilibria. Using
the same notation as above, we can have either: (a) µ1 = 1, or (b) µ1 + µ2 = 1, 0 < µ2 < 1, where
µ2 denotes the probability with which a buyer searches for 2 price quotations. When µ2 > 0 in
equilibrium, we shall say that there is a costly search equilibrium.
We now notice that µ1 > 0 in any equilibrium, regardless of whether buyers search sequentially
or non-sequentially; this implies that:
Lemma 2 Irrespective of the search behavior of uninformed consumers, if F (p) is an equilibrium
price distribution, then it is atomless. Hence, there is no pure strategy equilibrium.
Proof. See, e.g., Lemma 1 of Stahl (1989). ¥
This result shows that equilibria must necessarily exhibit price dispersion, and that firm pricing
is characterized by atomless price distributions in any case. In what follows we shall examine the
characterization and the existence of different equilibria, both under sequential and non-sequential
search. After this, we shall use the theoretical restrictions optimal pricing and optimal consumer
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search impose on the market to estimate parameters and to test the empirical usefulness of the
different models.
3.2 Firms’ equilibrium behavior
Case a: Costless search
First assume that uninformed buyers search for one price with probability 1, i.e., µ1 = 1. In such
case, the expected payoff to firm i from charging price pi when its rivals choose a random pricing
strategy according to the cumulative distribution F (·) is
pii(pi, F (pi)) = (pi − r)
[
1− λ
N
+ λ(1− F (pi))N−1
]
. (1)
This profit expression is easily understood. Firm i obtains a per consumer profit of pi − r. The
expected demand faced by a firm stems from the two different groups of consumers. Firm i attracts
the λ informed consumers when it charges a price that is lower than its rivals’, which happens with
probability (1 − F (pi))N−1. The firm also serves the 1 − λ uninformed consumers whenever they
they visit its store, which occurs with probability 1/N .
In equilibrium, a firm must be indifferent between charging any price in the support of F (·).
Let us denote the upper bound of F (·) by p¯. Any price in the support of F (·) must then satisfy
pii(pi, F (·)) = pii(p), i.e.,
(pi − r)
[
1− λ
N
+ λ(1− F (pi))N−1
]
=
(1− λ)(p− r)
N
. (2)
Solving this equation for the price distribution yields
F (p) = 1−
(
(1− λ)(p− p)
Nλ(p− r)
) 1
N−1
. (3)
Since F is a distribution function there must be some p for which F (p) = 0. Solving for p one
obtains the lower bound of the price distribution
p =
(1− λ)(p− r)
λN + (1− λ) + r. (4)
The price distribution (3) represents optimal firm pricing irrespective of whether uninformed
buyers search sequentially or non-sequentially. What distinguishes these two is the maximum price
p firms will charge. Consider first the non-sequential search setting. The maximum price a firm will
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ever charge is v since no buyer who observed a price above his/her reservation price would acquire
the good. Further, the upper bound of the price distribution cannot be lower than v because a
firm charging the upper bound would gain by slightly raising its price. Thus, under non-sequential
search, it must be the case that p = v, with F (v) = 1 and F (p) < 1, for all p < v.
In the sequential search setting, things are slightly more complicated. Consider a buyer who
has observed a given price p. This consumer will continue searching if the expected benefits from
continued search exceed the search costs. We can define the reservation price ρ as the price that
makes a consumer indifferent between searching once more and accepting the price at hand; this
price satisfies: ∫ ρ
p
(ρ− p)f(p)dp = c. (5)
It is obvious that no firm will charge a price above ρ since this will lead to continued search. As
a result, under sequential search, the upper bound p = ρ. We now derive an expression for ρ.
Rewriting equation (5) gives
ρ
[
F (ρ)− F (p)]− ∫ ρ
p
pf(p)dp = c. (6)
Since F (ρ) = 1, F (p) = 0 and
∫ ρ
p pf(p)dp = E[p], equation (6) can be rewritten as
ρ−E[p]− c = (ρ− r)− (E[p]− r)− c = 0. (7)
To calculate E[p]− r we solve equation (3) for p− r, which gives
p− r = ρ− r
1 + bN(1− F )N−1 , (8)
where b = λ/(1− λ) > 0. We note now that E[p]− r = ρ− r − ∫ ρp F (p)dp. By changing variables
we can write E[p]− r = ∫ 10 (p− r)dy. Plugging p− r from equation (8) gives, after rewriting,
E[p]− r = (ρ− r)
∫ 1
0
dy
1 + bNyN−1
. (9)
Equation (9) can be plugged into equation (7) to solve for ρ:
ρ =
c
1− ∫ 10 dy1+bNyN−1 + r, (10)
We note that the reservation price ρ increases in c, decreases in λ and is insensitive to v. This
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equilibrium exists for all parameters. We will use equations (3), (4), and (10) to estimate the
parameters of the model.
In case consumers search non-sequentially, equilibrium existence requires, that uninformed con-
sumers prefer searching once over searching twice, i.e., v − E[min{pi, pj}] − c < v − E[p], for all
i, j ∈ N . This condition can be rewritten as
∫ 1
0
2y − 1
1 + bN(1− y)N−1dy <
c
v − r . (11)
and will be used to estimate the non-sequential costless search equilibrium along with equations
(3) and (4). For future reference, let us denote the left-hand-side of equation (11) as Γ(1;λ;N).12
We note that 0 < Γ(1;λ;N) < 1 for all parameters. Then we can state:
Proposition 1 (a) A sequential costless search equilibrium exists where buyers search for one price
and firms charge prices from the set [(1 − λ)(ρ − r)/(λN + (1 − λ)) + r, ρ] according to the price
distribution
F (p) = 1−
(
(1− λ)(ρ− p)
Nλ(p− r)
) 1
N−1
,
where ρ solves equation (10). (b) Let Γ(1;λ;N) < cv−r . Then a non-sequential costless search
equilibrium exists where firms charge prices from the set [(1 − λ)(v − r)/(λN + (1 − λ)) + r, v]
according to the price distribution
F (p) = 1−
(
(1− λ)(v − p)
Nλ(p− r)
) 1
N−1
.
It is readily seen that the price distribution under non-sequential search dominates in a first-
order stochastic sense the price distribution under sequential search. This illustrates the influence
consumers’ threat to search further has on price setting.
Case b: Costly search
Assume that uninformed consumers randomize between searching for one price quotation with
probability µ1, and searching for two price quotations with probability µ2 = 1 − µ1.13 As argued
above, this case only arises under non-sequential search. The expected payoff to firm i is
pii(pi, F (p)) = (pi − r)
[
λ(1− F (pi))N−1 + 2(1− λ)(1− µ1)
N
(1− F (pi)) + (1− λ)µ1
N
]
. (12)
12The number 1 in the arguments of Γ(·) stands for µ1=1.
13For ease of exposition, we maintain the notation used so far in the sense that µ1 denotes the probability with
which uninformed buyers search for one price.
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Again, firm i makes a per consumer profit of pi−r and expected demand stems from three different
groups of customers: informed consumers, uninformed consumers who observe two prices and
uninformed consumers who observe just a single price.
In equilibrium, a firm must be indifferent between charging any price in the support of F . The
arguments above imply that F (v) = 1, and F (p) < 1, for all p < v. Any price in the support of F
must satisfy pii(pi, F (·)) = pii(v), i.e.,
(p− r)
[
(1− λ)µ1
N
+
2(1− λ)(1− µ1)
N
(1− F (p)) + λ(1− F (p))N−1
]
=
µ1(1− λ)(v − r)
N
. (13)
Equation (13) cannot be solved for F (p) for general values of N , but by setting F (p) = 0, the lower
bound of the price distribution can be found:
p =
µ1(1− λ)(v − r)
(1− λ)(2− µ1) +Nλ + r. (14)
The final step is to confront equation (13) with optimal search behavior of the uninformed
consumers. A mixed strategy over the support [p, v] according to the cumulative distribution
function F , which solves (13), is optimal if and only if uninformed consumers are indeed indifferent
between searching for only one price and searching for two prices. Therefore, it must be the case
that v − E[min{pi, pj}] − 2c = v − E[p] − c, for all i, j ∈ N . In other words, the following must
hold: ∫ 1
0
2y − 1
1 + 2( 1µ1 − 1)(1− y) + 1µ1 bN(1− y)N−1
dy =
c
v − r . (15)
Let Γ(µ1, λ,N) denote the LHS of equation (15). We note that Γ(0, λ,N) = 0. Moreover,
Γ(µ1, λ,N) is positive for all µ1, and concave in µ1. Let Γ¯(µ1, λ,N) = maxµ1∈(0,1] Γ(µ1, λ,N).
14
Then:
Proposition 2 Let 0 < cv−r < Γ(µ1, N, λ). Then, there exist at least one and at most two symmet-
ric costly search equilibria. In equilibrium, consumers search with a high intensity µ∗1 ∈ (0, 1) given
by the solution to equation (15) and firms randomly select prices from the set
[
µ∗1(1−λ)v
Nλ+(1−λ)(2−µ∗1) + r, v
]
according to the price distribution that solves equation (13).
For some parameters, there may be two equilibria. They differ in the probability with which
consumers search for two prices. Fershtman and Fishman (1992) have pointed out that only the
equilibrium where consumers search for two prices with higher probability is stable. In the remain-
14See Janssen and Moraga-Gonza´lez (2004) for a derivation of equation (15) and these properties.
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ing of the paper, we shall focus on this stable equilibrium. We shall use equations (13), (14) and
(15) to estimate the costly search equilibrium.
In summary, under non-sequential search there are two equilibria. If search cost is large con-
sumers search for one price with probability one. When search cost is low buyers search more in
equilibrium. This yields two important insights. (i) For a fixed λ, consumers tend search more in
markets where the relative value of the purchase is larger. (ii) For a fixed c/(v−r), consumers tend
to search more in markets with more informed buyers. Despite the difficulties to observe buyers
search intensity in real-world markets, casual evidence tells us that an individual buyer searches
more in some markets than in others. This casual observation is confirmed by Johnson et al.(2004)
who find that on the Web 70% of CD shoppers, 70% of book purchasers and 36 % of travel buyers
were observed to visit just one site. Since consumers search activity feeds back into firm pricing
behavior and vice versa, our empirical research shall shed light on whether consumers search much
or little in equilibrium.
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Estimation
In this subsection we discuss the estimation procedure by maximum likelihood. The empirical
strategy is as follows. For a given product and a given cross-section price data, we first obtain
an estimate of the different theoretical density functions that correspond to the distinct search
equilibria. Next, we test which of the density functions is most likely and whether it is probable
that the empirical price distributions for each product are drawn from the estimated theoretical
distribution functions.
In order to estimate the different search equilibria, we first derive the density functions associ-
ated with the equilibrium price distributions given in equations (3) and (13). The density function
for the costless search equilibrium is
f(p) =
1
N − 1
(
p− p
p− r
) 2−N
N−1
(
1− λ
Nλ
) 1
N−1 p− r
(p− r)2 , (16)
where p is either v or ρ depending on which search protocol is assumed. As we will explain in more
detail later, in order to get consistent estimates of the unknown parameters of the model, we shall
take v or ρ as known and equal to the upper bound of the observed price distribution. This implies
that the only way to distinguish between the sequential and the non-sequential search protocols
11
is to impose a priori restrictions on the level of search costs and compare the estimates equations
(10) and (11) yield.
As we pointed out above, the density function for the costly search equilibrium cannot be
derived analytically for general values of N . Nevertheless, using the implicit function theorem in
equation (13), we can obtain an expression for f(p) as a function of F (p):
f(p) =
λN (1− F (p))N−1 + 2 (1− λ) (1− µ1) (1− F (p)) + (1− λ)µ1
(p− r)
(
λN (N − 1) (1− F (p))N−2 + 2 (1− λ) (1− µ1)
) . (17)
We shall solve equation (13) numerically for F (p) and use it in equation (17) to obtain the density
function.
To investigate which of the search equilibria (the costly or the costless search equilibrium) gives
a better description of the data, it is important to notice that these two equilibria are empirically
nested, i.e., the costless search equilibrium is a special case of the costly search equilibrium. This
can easily be seen by setting µ1 = 1 and plugging equation (13) into equation (17), which will give
a density function equal to equation (16).
We set the number of firms N equal to the number of price observations found in the data.
The objective is to maximize the log-likelihood function, which is given by LL =
∑N
i=1 log f(pi).
Because the support of the log-likelihood function depends upon unknown parameters, maximum
likelihood estimation is not standard. Following Kiefer and Neumann (1993) we take the sampling
minimum and maximum to estimate p and p, respectively.15 These super-consistent estimates allow
us to proceed as if p and p were known. Using p and p in (4) and (14) yield expressions which can
be solved for the marginal cost r. This gives r = p − (1 − λ)(p − p)/λN in the case of costless
search, and r = p − µ1(1 − λ)(p − p)/(λN + 2(1 − λ)(1 − µ1)) in the costly search equilibrium.
Plugging these values in equations (16) and (17) allows us to eliminate r from the density functions
so that maximum likelihood can be applied. The parameters left for estimation are λ for the case
of costless search, and λ and µ1 for the case of costly search.
We use the Broyden, Fletcher, Goldfarb and Shanno (BFGS) quasi-Newton method with a
mixed quadratic and cubic line search procedure to find the combination of λ and µ1 that maximizes
LL given N , the consistent estimates of p and p and the vector of remaining prices, i.e, all the
prices apart from the maximum and the minimum price. The BFGS quasi-Newton method uses
the observed behavior of the log-likelihood function and its gradient to make an approximation to
15More on using order statistics to estimate the lower and upper bound of distributions can be found in Van den
Berg and Ridder (1993, 1998) and Donald and Paarsch (1993).
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the Hessian matrix using the BFGS iterative updating technique. This method is implemented via
a Matlab routine. We use random values for λ and µ1 as starting points and estimate the model
several times to make sure that the outcome does not depend on the starting values.16 Given these
estimates of the parameters we can derive the level of search cost c that is consistent with optimal
consumer search using equations (10), (11) and (15). Standard errors for λ and µ1 are estimated
by calculating the analytic Hessian matrix, given the estimates of λ and µ1. Standard errors for r
and c are calculated using the delta method.17
Because the costless and the costly search equilibria are empirically nested, likelihood scores can
be directly compared between the two. Since the costly search equilibrium differs from the costless
search equilibrium by the addition of an extra parameter, the likelihood score of the costly search
equilibrium will always be higher than that of the costless search equilibrium. However, it could
be the case that the additional parameter is not justified in terms of a significant improvement in
the fit of the model. To formally test this, we perform a Likelihood Ratio (LR) test. Define
LR = −2(lnLL1 − lnLL2),
where LL1 is the likelihood score of the costless search equilibrium, LL2 is the likelihood score of
the costly search equilibrium. LR follows a χ2 distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the
number of additional parameters in the costly search equilibrium.
The comparison of likelihood scores gives information about the relative performance of the
equilibria, but in order to test how well the estimated density function fits the data, we use a chi-
squared test of fit. This test checks whether the price observations for a given product in a given
moment in time are likely to be drawn from the theoretical distribution function. To do this, we
divide the range of observed prices into k classes. A comparison of the observed frequency with the
estimated hypothetical frequency of prices in the k classes gives information about the goodness of
fit. The classical Pearson chi-squared statistic is given by
X2 =
k∑
i=1
(Mi −Nϕi)2
Nϕi
,
16These random starting values for λ and µ1, together with N , p, p and a price pi are plugged into equation (13) to
find the value of F (pi) that solves this equation; this is done for all prices in the cross-section pi. Subsequently, the
calculated values of F (p), together with N , p, p, the vector of remaining prices and the starting values of λ and µ1 are
plugged into equation (16) to calculate the vector f(p), from which we can calculate LL. The BFGS quasi-Newton
method then comes with a new λ and µ1, from which we calculate a new value for LL. This process continues until
the optimal λ and µ1 are found, i.e., LL is maximized.
17If r is a function of the estimated λ and µ, then the variance of r is given by ∂r
∂θ
· (−H)−1 · ∂r
∂θ
′
, where H is the
Hessian matrix and θ is the vector of estimated parameters.
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where Mi is the observed frequency for class i, N is the total number of price observations and
ϕi =
∫
z dF (p) is the theoretical probability that a price observation falls in class i with boundary
z. When F (p) is fully specified, X2 follows a χ2 distribution with k − 1 degrees of freedom.
However, in our case F (p) is not completely specified (either λ, or λ and µ1 are estimated). Since
we are using maximum likelihood to estimate the parameters, X2 does not have an asymptotic
χ2 distribution: the distribution of X2 is bounded between a χ2k−1 and a χ
2
k−q−1 variable, where
q is the number of estimated parameters (Kendall and Stuart (1973), p. 447). To bypass this
uncertainty in degrees of freedom when F (p) is estimated by ordinary maximum likelihood, we
shall use the Rao-Robson statistic (Rao and Robson, 1974). The Rao-Robson statistic RR corrects
for the uncertainty involved in estimating F (p) and builds up the Pearson statistic X2 to χ2k−1.
Put more formally,
RR = X2 + (V ′B)(J −B′B)−1(V ′B)′,
where X2 is the Pearson chi-squared statistic, V ′B = n−
1
2
(∑k
i=1
Mi
ϕi
∂ϕi
∂θ1
, . . . , Miϕi
∂ϕi
∂θq
)
, with θ the
vector of parameters to be estimated, J is the Fisher information matrix for F (· | θ), and B(θ) is
the matrix with (i, j)th entry ϕi(θ)−
1
2
∂ϕi(θ)
∂θj
. RR follows a χ2k−1 distribution. The smaller RR, the
better the fit is. If the fit is perfect, RR is zero. In calculating RR we shall use equiprobable classes
k. Although the choice of the number of classes k remains somewhat arbitrary, we will follow the
recommendations made by Moore (1986) for a five percent level of significance, i.e., k is taken to
be the closest integer to 2N
2
5 .
4.2 The data
A market most suitable in terms of the model of the previous section would consist of firms offering
a homogeneous product to consumers who demand at most a single unit of the product. Keeping
this in mind, we have chosen to focus on the on-line markets for computer hardware and peripherals.
In particular, we concentrate on keyboards, memory chips, mice and computer cables. In our view,
these markets come quite close to the market outlined above in Section 2.18
To streamline the process of collecting data, price observations are collected daily from March
till April 2004 on shopper.com, a large American shopbot.19 The United States have a relatively
18Of course, it is clear that these markets have features that are not accounted for in our theoretical model. To
mention an example, there are several ways in which a firm can ship a product to a client; this makes the bundle
product-shipping a differentiated item. Consumers probably do take these extra costs into account when deciding
which store to buy from. However, including shipping and handling fees would complicate matters too much so we
abstract from them in what follows.
19See http://shopper.cnet.com.
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long history of E-commerce. Already in the 1980s products were sold via the Internet. At that time,
only of a fraction of the people that nowadays are on-line had access to the Internet. According to
Nielsen//NetRatings, in February 2004 three out of four Americans, or more than 200 million, had
access to the Internet.20 Among people aged between 35 and 54 the Internet access penetration
rate – defined as the percentage of people who have access to the Internet, though not necessarily
logging on-line during a specific time frame – was even more than eighty percent. As recent figures
show, these people get more and more accustomed to on-line shopping. According to the eSpending
Report from Goldman Sachs, Harris Interactive and Nielsen//NetRatings, on-line consumers spent
$18.5 billion (excluding travel) during the 2003 Christmas holiday season, an increase of 35 percent
compared to the year before.21 With projected on-line revenues of $1,650 million during the 2003
Christmas holiday season, the on-line market for computer hardware and peripherals covers a
substantial part of the total on-line market.
In an ideal situation, the shopbot would give us the prices of all available on-line stores in the
United States. Although shopper.com gives a substantial number of retailers for most products, we
realize that there are more on-line stores selling computer hardware and peripherals in the United
States than shopper.com actually gives. However, if we assume that the list of prices shopper.com
offers is not biased in some sense, this does not pose a problem.
We have collected prices for 91 products in total: 22 keyboards, 22 mice, 22 cables and 25
memory chips. The observations that follow are common to all products so in the remainder
of this section we will focus the discussion solely on keyboards. Table 1 presents the summary
statistics for the product category keyboards.22 The keyboards are sorted by increasing value.
Lower quality (valued) keyboards (keyboards with a maximum price below $30.00) were selected
by taking the eleven lowest priced products in the category keyboards on shopper.com, conditional
on that at least five shops were selling the product on the first day of data gathering. Higher valued
keyboards were selected by taking the eleven most popular products from the category keyboards
on shopper.com with a highest price above $50 on the first day of data gathering, again only if the
number of shops selling the product was at least five.23 The horizontal line in Table 1 separates
the results for the two groups of products.24 As the table shows, for all keyboards there is quite
20See http://direct.www.nielsen-netratings.com/pr/pr 040318.pdf.
21See http://www.nielsen-netratings.com/pr/pr 040105 us.pdf.
22Summary statistics for memory chips, mice and cables are skipped to save on space.
23We note that 4 products were left out of the analysis subsequently because the number of shops declined to less
than three over time.
24The same criteria for data selection as well as for the analysis apply to memory chips, mice and computer cables
as well.
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Name Product t obs N avg min max max-min var cv
Micro Innovations Datapad TKB195S 38 261 6.87 8.46 6.49 12.99 6.50 5.40 0.27
BenQ Regular Membrane 52XA 38 266 7.00 10.05 7.74 15.63 7.89 7.23 0.27
Labtec Standard Keyboard 38 289 7.61 10.52 7.50 16.13 8.83 12.53 0.33
Belkin Standard Keyboard 38 387 10.18 9.85 7.09 17.18 10.09 9.12 0.30
Adesso KB9001 38 192 5.05 11.17 8.54 17.18 8.64 14.56 0.34
Key Tronic E03601 (grey) 38 366 9.63 10.59 7.25 17.70 10.45 11.90 0.33
Key Tronic E03600 (beige) 38 446 11.74 10.38 6.45 18.00 11.55 11.80 0.33
Micro Innovations KB400i 38 473 12.45 11.65 6.99 23.38 16.39 37.00 0.52
IBM Wireless Navigator Pro 38 346 9.11 45.21 39.99 50.20 10.21 14.05 0.08
Adesso AKB-805MAC 38 431 11.34 53.38 47.38 59.99 12.62 17.30 0.08
Microsoft Basic Wireless Optical Desktop 38 595 15.66 53.34 43.46 61.99 18.83 37.73 0.11
Logitech Cordless Navigator Duo 38 1028 27.05 63.91 46.39 79.99 33.60 86.06 0.15
Logitech Cordless MX Duo 38 1254 33.00 80.81 65.58 99.99 34.41 86.94 0.12
Microsoft Wireless Optical Desktop Elite 38 839 22.08 84.65 71.95 99.99 28.04 54.46 0.09
Microsoft Wireless Optical Desktop for Bluetooth 38 712 18.74 95.39 76.78 139.90 63.12 299.50 0.18
Logitech Cordless Desktop MX for Bluetooth 38 952 25.05 156.19 134.00 179.94 45.94 159.94 0.08
Gyration Ultra GT Full-Size Keyboard Suite 38 677 17.82 110.82 88.33 180.00 91.67 802.25 0.26
Gyration Ultra GT Compact Keyboard Suite 38 676 17.79 127.75 106.13 181.20 75.07 618.72 0.19
Logitech DiNovo Media Desktop 38 739 19.45 219.67 188.89 263.12 74.22 415.99 0.09
Notes: t is the number of days of data gathering, obs is the total number of observations, N is the average number of shops,
avg is the average average price, min is the average minimum price, max is the average maximum price, var is the average
variance and cv is the average coefficient of variation, i.e., squared root of the variance scaled by the average price.
Table 1: Summary statistics for product category “keyboards”
a big difference between the maximum and the minimum price found. Other indicators of price
dispersion, like variance and the coefficient of variation (squared root of the variance divided by
the average price), also point towards substantial price dispersion. This implies that the gains from
search are large in these markets. Notice that the coefficient of variation, which is a scaled indicator
of price dispersion, seems to be decreasing in the value of the product.
Figure 1 presents price-histograms for two keyboards (including mouse) collected on March
1, 2004. Also this figure shows that there is substantial price dispersion, with some prices being
twice as high as others. The histogram for ‘Microsoft Wireless Optical Desktop for Bluetooth’
represented by Graph 1(a) shows a large mass of shops quoting prices relatively low; by contrast,
Graph 1(b) for ‘Microsoft Basic Wireless Optical Desktop’ shows a spike on the right side of the
graph, indicating that for this keyboard shops price less competitively.
4.3 Results
The results for the different product categories are, from the point of view of the purpose of
testing the two search equilibria, quite similar to each other. As we do not intend to give a detailed
description of the different markets, we have decided to show the results of the estimation procedure
for one subcategory, namely keyboards, in the main text of the paper. The results for the other
product categories, i.e. memory chips, mice and computer cables, can be found in the appendix.
Consider first the estimates of the parameters of the costless search equilibrium. The results
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(a) Microsoft Wireless Optical Desktop for Bluetooth (b) Microsoft Basic Wireless Optical Desktop
Figure 1: Histograms (March 1, 2004)
are presented in Table 2. As the table shows, estimates of the share of consumers using a shopbot
λ range between 0.65 and 0.95 and are highly significant. We note that these estimates seem quite
high on the basis of findings by other authors (although somewhat outdated, Whelan (2001) finds
that around 36 percent of on-line shoppers can be classified as bargain hunters). Using the estimates
of λ, we can calculate estimates of unit costs r and consumer search costs c. As Table 1 shows,
in most cases unit cost r is close to the lower bound of the price distribution p, which means that
shops quoting low prices have quite small margins. The search costs that are consistent with the
sequential search model, denoted cS in the Table, vary between $2.95 and $23.87 and seem to be
increasing in the value of the product. The lowest search costs capable of rationalizing the costless
search equilibrium in the non-sequential case, denoted cNS in the Table, are uniformly lower.
The Rao-Robson test statistics show that for almost half of the lower valued keyboards the
null hypothesis that the observed prices are generated from a costless search equilibrium cannot
be rejected; however, for higher valued keyboards, the costless search equilibrium always performs
poorly.25 The discussion of the theoretical model, especially the one on the non-sequential search
model, gives us a possible explanation for this observation: the higher v − r, the less likely the
costless search equilibrium is. However, since Table 1 reveals that v − r is highly correlated with
N , it could also be the case that the likelihood of the costless search equilibrium decreases in N .
We note that the high correlation between N and v − r is natural in these models, since products
with higher absolute margins should attract new entrants.
25We note that also according to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (results not presented here), which is calculated
as the greatest discrepancy between the observed and expected cumulative distribution function, the costless search
equilibrium performs much better for higher valued keyboards than for lower valued keyboards.
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We now turn to discuss the estimation results of the costly search equilibrium. Table 3 gives
the results of the estimation procedure and Rao-Robson chi-squared test for the costly search
equilibrium. Estimates of λ range from 0.05 to 0.74 across keyboards and are much lower than
previous estimates of λ for the costless search equilibrium. Estimates of µ1 range between 0.16 and
0.72 and are on average highly significant. Estimates of marginal costs r are on average lower than
under costless search, which suggests that retailers’ price-to-cost margins in the equilibrium with
costly search are higher than those in the equilibrium with costless search. The estimated values of
the search cost parameter c are much lower under costly search than under costless search, which is
what one would expect given the theoretical analysis above. Moreover, we notice that search costs
for higher valued keyboards are again somewhat higher than for the rest of the products.
Name Product LR p-value rej. 5% rej. 1%
Micro Innovations Datapad TKB195S 7.00 0.008 yes yes
BenQ Regular Membrane 52XA 8.40 0.004 yes yes
Labtec Standard Keyboard 4.67 0.031 yes no
Belkin Standard Keyboard 19.32 0.000 yes yes
Adesso KB9001 4.07 0.044 yes no
Key Tronic E03601 (grey) 11.67 0.001 yes yes
Key Tronic E03600 (beige) 22.55 0.000 yes yes
Micro Innovations KB400i 29.97 0.000 yes yes
IBM Wireless Navigator Pro 11.26 0.001 yes yes
Adesso AKB-805MAC 19.11 0.000 yes yes
Microsoft Basic Wireless Optical Desktop 29.06 0.000 yes yes
Logitech Cordless Navigator Duo 87.65 0.000 yes yes
Logitech Cordless MX Duo 109.27 0.000 yes yes
Microsoft Wireless Optical Desktop Elite 71.06 0.000 yes yes
Microsoft Wireless Optical Desktop for Bluetooth 52.85 0.000 yes yes
Logitech Cordless Desktop MX for Bluetooth 72.76 0.000 yes yes
Gyration Ultra GT Full-Size Keyboard Suite 50.34 0.000 yes yes
Gyration Ultra GT Compact Keyboard Suite 38.31 0.000 yes yes
Logitech DiNovo Media Desktop 54.94 0.000 yes yes
Table 4: Likelihood Ratio Test Results
The Rao-Robson chi-squared statistics indicate that the costly search equilibrium serves as a
good approximation of reality for all keyboards. All the keyboards have a Rao-Robson statistic that
is below the critical value corresponding to a 5% level of significance. This means that for 100%
of the keyboards, the null hypothesis that the observed prices come from the estimated theoretical
distribution function F (p) with costly search cannot be rejected.26
The LR test results presented in Table 4 formalize what is already indicated by the comparison of
the Rao-Robson statistics between the costless search equilibrium and the costly search equilibrium:
26This also holds according to Kolmogorov-Smirnov test results.
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the latter outperforms the former one. At a 5% level of significance, the null hypothesis that the
equilibria are equal is rejected for all keyboards; at a 1% level of significance the costly search
equilibrium performs better than the costless search equilibrium for all but two keyboards.
Figure 2 gives examples of how the estimated theoretical distribution functions match observed
price data. The thick curves in the graphs represent the empirical distribution function of prices
for three different products collected on March 1, 2004, while the dotted curves give the estimated
theoretical distribution functions for respectively the costless search equilibrium and the costly
search equilibrium. The graphs reveal that the costly search equilibrium outperforms the costless
search one for all three products. However, graph 2(e), and, to a lesser extent graph 2(c), show
that the costless search equilibrium can generate satisfying results, given that v (and N) are low.
Summing up, the estimates obtained for the costly search equilibrium explain the observed data
remarkably well for almost all products. The costless search equilibrium is a good approximation
of retailer behavior as well, provided that the relative value of the purchase is low.
5 Conclusion
This paper has examined the empirical predictions that come out of a simple oligopolistic pricing
game in the presence of consumer search. Firms were all identical and set prices to maximize
profits; consumers differed in that some are fully informed, while others are uninformed. We have
seen that different equilibria can arise for different parameter constellations. These equilibria are all
characterized by price dispersion and we have distinguished between them in terms of the intensity
with which consumers search. In a costless search equilibrium, uninformed consumers search for
one price only. This type of equilibrium can arise in both the sequential and non-sequential search
setting. In a costly search equilibrium, uninformed consumers randomize between searching for one
and two prices. This equilibrium arises when consumers search non-sequentially and search costs
are sufficiently low.
The theoretical restrictions that firm and consumer equilibrium behavior yield have been used
to estimate the equilibria. We have gathered price data for computer hardware and peripherals;
the price observations have been downloaded from an American based search engine. The main
conclusion we have drawn is that the costless search equilibrium only generates satisfying results
when the value of the purchase (and thus the number of firms) is low, while the costly search
equilibrium outperforms the alternative equilibrium in all cases. Given the simplicity of the model,
the estimated fit of the costly search equilibrium to the data is remarkably good.
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(a) Costless search – Microsoft Wireless Optical Desk-
top for Bluetooth (N = 20, v = 139.90)
(b) Costly search – Microsoft Wireless Optical Desk-
top for Bluetooth (N = 20, v = 139.90)
(c) Costless search – Micro PS2 Comfort Mouse (N =
8, v = 7.99)
(d) Costly search – Micro PS2 Comfort Mouse (N =
8, v = 7.99)
(e) Costless search – StarTech MXT100 (N = 5, v =
5.99)
(f) Costly search – StarTech MXT100 (N = 5, v =
5.99)
Figure 2: Fit estimated theoretical cumulative distribution functions (March 1, 2004)
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Name Product LR p-value rej. 5% rej. 1%
Memorex PS/2 Mouse 6.32 0.012 yes no
Belkin PS/2 Mouse 13.46 0.000 yes yes
Micro PS/2 Comfort Mouse 3.73 0.053 no no
Belkin USB Mouse (black) 12.64 0.000 yes yes
Belkin USB Mouse 12.72 0.000 yes yes
Kensington PS/2 Valumouse 16.56 0.000 yes yes
Labtec PS/2 Mouse 1.00 0.317 no no
Belkin PS/2 Mouse (black) 7.26 0.007 yes yes
Belkin PS/2 Scroll Mouse (black) 15.46 0.000 yes yes
Fellowes PS/2 Mouse Platinum 12.17 0.000 yes yes
Belking Nostrom N30 Game Mouse 22.08 0.000 yes yes
Microsoft Wireless Optical Mouse (steel blue) 40.90 0.000 yes yes
Microsoft Wireless Optical Mouse (periwinkle) 36.27 0.000 yes yes
Targus Noteworthy Optical Screen Scroller 17.89 0.000 yes yes
Microsoft Wireless Optical Mouse (blue) 45.72 0.000 yes yes
Sony USB Optical Mouse (silver) 34.27 0.000 yes yes
Sony USB Optical Mouse (purple) 33.71 0.000 yes yes
Belkin Wireless Optical Mini Mouse 41.59 0.000 yes yes
Targus Wireless Optical Mouse with Charger 36.02 0.000 yes yes
Targus Wireless Optical Mini Scroll Mouse (silver) 54.34 0.000 yes yes
Logitech Wireless Optical Mouse Notebooks (black) 29.29 0.000 yes yes
Kingston KVR266X64C25/128 54.15 0.000 yes yes
Kingston KVR333X64C25/128 40.16 0.000 yes yes
Kingston KVR266X64SC25/256 40.45 0.000 yes yes
Kingston KVR400X64C3/256 50.83 0.000 yes yes
Kingston KVR333X72RC25/256 16.19 0.000 yes yes
Kingston KVR333X64C25/256 86.32 0.000 yes yes
Kingston KVR333X64C25/512 93.39 0.000 yes yes
Kingston KVR266X64SC25/512 37.31 0.000 yes yes
Kingston KVR266X64C2/512 33.39 0.000 yes yes
Kingston KVR400X64C3/512 9.51 0.002 yes yes
Kingston KTD4400/512 54.48 0.000 yes yes
Kingston KVR266X72C2/512 17.05 0.000 yes yes
Kingston KVR400X64C25/512 27.36 0.000 yes yes
Kingston KVR333X72C25/512 33.29 0.000 yes yes
Kingston KVR400X64C3A/512 63.30 0.000 yes yes
Kingston KTDINSP8200/512 49.11 0.000 yes yes
Kingston KTAPBG4266/512 43.35 0.000 yes yes
Kingston KTCP2800/512 64.49 0.000 yes yes
Kingston KTT3614/512 73.82 0.000 yes yes
Simpletech STD1350/512 6.93 0.008 yes yes
Kingston KVR266X64C25/1G 41.54 0.000 yes yes
Viking MG5/1GBD3 27.82 0.000 yes yes
Kingston KVR400X64C3AK2/1G 86.19 0.000 yes yes
Kingston KVR333X64C25/1G 33.36 0.000 yes yes
Kingston KHX3200AK2/1G 27.04 0.000 yes yes
StarTech MXT100 2.34 0.126 no no
Tripp Lite P156-000 2.17 0.141 no no
Tripp Lite P920-006 3.50 0.061 no no
Tripp Lite P006-006 10.36 0.001 yes yes
Tripp Lite M005-006 4.95 0.026 yes no
Tripp Lite P150-000 3.96 0.047 yes no
Cables To Go 03166 2.57 0.109 no no
American Power Conversion 1718 6.16 0.013 yes no
Tripp Lite P102-000 5.12 0.024 yes no
Belkin F2N034-06 16.55 0.000 yes yes
Belkin F1D9501-06 17.44 0.000 yes yes
Belkin F1D9402-20 33.37 0.000 yes yes
Nortel Networks 7832 1.44 0.230 no no
Nortel Networks 7831 9.15 0.002 yes yes
Digi 76000071 24.82 0.000 yes yes
Cisco CAB-RPSY-2218= 54.78 0.000 yes yes
Belkin F3X1105-06KIT 11.00 0.001 yes yes
Raritan USNED 10.41 0.001 yes yes
IBM 31P6103 19.20 0.000 yes yes
Fluke NFK1LC 15.33 0.000 yes yes
NetScreen NS-050-001 8.81 0.003 yes yes
Table 11: Likelihood Ratio Test Results
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